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A B S T R A C T
Adolescence is a critical period for the initiation of risk-taking behaviors. We examined the longitudinal inter-
play between neural correlates of risk processing and cognitive control in predicting risk-taking behaviors via
stress. The sample consisted of 167 adolescents (53% males) who were assessed twice (MAgeTime1= 14.13,
MAgeTime2= 15.05). Neural risk processing was operationalized as blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) re-
sponses in the anterior insula during a lottery choice task and neural cognitive control as BOLD responses during
an inhibitory control task. Adolescents reported on perceived stress and risk-taking behaviors. Structural
equation modeling analyses indicated that low insular risk processing predicted increases in perceived stress,
while perceived stress did not predict changes in insular risk processing across one year. Moreover, signiﬁcant
moderation by neural cognitive control indicated that low insular risk processing predicted increases in risk-
taking behaviors via increases in perceived stress among adolescents with poor neural cognitive control, but not
among adolescents with good neural cognitive control. The results suggest that risk processing in the anterior
insular cortex plays an important role in stress experience and risk-taking behaviors particularly for vulnerable
adolescents with poor neural cognitive control.
1. Introduction
It is well known that adolescence is a developmental period char-
acterized by increases in stressful experiences (Dahl and Gunnar, 2009),
and for some, increases in risky behaviors (Kann et al., 2016). Yet, not
all adolescents are vulnerable to engaging in risky behaviors. To explain
individual diﬀerences in risk-taking, we focus on the valuation system
that is involved in estimating the incentive value of diﬀerent options
and the control system that is involved in inhibiting prepotent re-
sponses (van den Bos et al., 2015). We further propose that the valua-
tion system and the control system interact with each other to con-
tribute to individual diﬀerences in risk-taking—processes that may
generalize to most or all time points of the adolescent and young adult
phase of development (Kim-Spoon et al., 2017b). While prior research
has primarily focused on the extent to which adolescents respond to
valued rewards, a recent cross-sectional study demonstrated that this
valuation system likely involves recruitment of the insular cortex for
processing risk or the likelihood of potential reward values, and that
signaling in this region interacts with the neural activation related to
cognitive control in prefrontal cortex to predict risk-taking behaviors in
adolescents (Kim-Spoon et al., 2017a). Given that adolescence is a time
of elevated stress and increases in risky behavior, the present study
aims to expand on this prior work to better understand the role of stress
in linking neural development of valuation and control systems to risk-
taking behaviors.
Value-based decision-making research has shown that risky choices
are driven by not only neural computations associated with the value of
rewards, but also the likelihood of receiving such rewards (d’Acremont
and Bossaerts, 2008; Mohr et al., 2010). For instance, an adolescent
may be driven to make a risky choice because he or she values the
outcome of a decision or because the valued outcome has a high like-
lihood of occurring. One of the key regions consistently implicated in
the processing of risk information is the anterior insular cortex (Mohr
et al., 2010; Richards et al., 2013). The insular cortex acts as a signal,
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guiding adolescents towards or away from risky choices consistent with
individual preferences for risk. When making decisions, adolescents
recruit the insular cortex more than children or adults, and adolescents’
hypersensitivity of the insular cortex to increasing variance of potential
outcomes may be related to making safer choices (van Duijvenvoorde
et al., 2015), highlighting the important role of the insula during ado-
lescence (Smith et al., 2014). In addition, consistent with the theoretical
perspective emphasizing the interaction between motivational and
cognitive control neural systems (Kim-Spoon et al., 2017b), a recent
study has shown that adolescents who engaged in risk-taking behaviors
experienced blunted reactivity in the insular cortex to risky options in a
lottery choice task. However, this relation was found only for adoles-
cents who exhibited high interference-related dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC) reactivity (i.e., poor cognitive control), but not for those
adolescents who displayed low interference-related dACC activity (i.e.,
good cognitive control; Kim-Spoon et al., 2017a). Within the neu-
roscience literature, previous studies have identiﬁed brain regions in-
volved in inhibition, including the basal ganglia (such as caudate, pu-
tamen, globus pallidus), that are thought to be involved in inhibition of
inappropriate responses, and prefrontal regions (such as inferior,
medial, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices) that receive inputs from
the limbic basal ganglia thalamocortical circuit and represent and
maintain relevant information for goal directed behaviors (Aron et al.,
2014; Booth et al., 2003; Casey et al., 2001). Here, we focus on brain
regions that are closely related to cognitive control over interference
measured by brain activation during an inhibitory control task pri-
marily involving medial prefrontal cortices.
While adolescence has been marked as a developmental period of
increases in risky behavior, it is also known as a time of elevated stress
(Dahl and Gunnar, 2009; Fuhrmann et al., 2015). Stress has been de-
scribed as experiences that present as either psychologically or phy-
siologically taxing (McEwen, 2007). Most prior behavioral research
examining the eﬀects of acute stress on decision making used experi-
mentally manipulated stressors and suggested that stress may increase
risky decisions and alter neural activity in insula during decision
making under risk (Starcke and Brand, 2016). For example, one avail-
able study demonstrated that adults who reported higher perceived
chronic stress showed less insula blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD)
activation when experiencing losses in a monetary incentive delay task
(Treadway et al., 2013). However we note that this insula activation
was observed during the outcome processing instead of risk-related
decision-making phase. Another study indicated that actively making
decisions involving monetary reward (as opposed to not making deci-
sions by passively following instructions) under acute stress was ac-
companied by alterations in the activation of the insula (Lighthall et al.,
2012). Though not exactly testing stress eﬀects, one study examined the
interact eﬀects between the expected value (EV; the sum of the value of
each possible outcome weighted by each associated probability of oc-
currence) and urgency (manipulated sense of urgency) (Jones et al.,
2011). Rationally, options with a higher EV are favored, when all else is
equal. The results indicated the eﬀects of urgency on activation in
anterior insula as to the diﬀerence between positive and neutral EV
gambles: insular activation was lower for positive than neutral EV
gambles under high urgency, whereas the converse was observed under
low urgency. As such, prior studies have not investigated how stress
may inﬂuence risk processing during decision making—i.e., calculating
likelihood of receiving rewards (or variance of potential outcomes).
Also, prior studies are limited by their cross-sectional design and can
thus not evaluate the direction of eﬀects between stress and insular
processing
Based on the literature regarding the eﬀect of stress on insular
activation during decision making under risk (e.g., Starcke and Brand,
2016), it is expected that repeated exposure to stress may be an en-
vironmental risk factor that inﬂuences insular risk processing related
to decision making. It is also likely that individual diﬀerences in
neural risk sensitivity may aﬀect how individuals experience stressful
life events. That is, insula activation during risk processing may be a
neural risk factor that increases adolescents’ vulnerability to experi-
encing stress. Indeed, according to the stress generation theory
(Hammen, 2006), certain biological and personal vulnerabilities may
increase the likelihood to experience stressful life events (Hammen,
2006; Liu, 2013). It follows that susceptible individuals are more
likely to create contexts that are stressful, thereby increasing the
likelihood of recurrent or chronic stressful experiences. This theory is
supported by longitudinal studies in adults showing that more im-
pulsive individuals report experiencing more negative life events at a
later time (Iacovino et al., 2016; Liu and Kleiman, 2012). Decades of
research has demonstrated that decision-making situations involving
lack of predictability or control (i.e., uncertainty) regarding con-
sequences of actions can induce distress (for a review see Koolhaas
et al., 2011). Speciﬁcally, higher levels of uncertainty (i.e., lack of
control or unpredictability over outcomes) predict greater perceived
stress, which inﬂuences task performance (de Berker et al., 2016).
Therefore, decreased risk processing in the insula in response to risk-
related cues may also be related to the extent to which adolescents
experience episodic stressful life events.
In the current longitudinal study, we investigated the role of stress
in the joint contributions of neural cognitive control and insular risk
processing to real-life risk-taking behaviors during early to middle
adolescence, a developmental period during which motivational and
emotional reactivity is posited to be particularly strong (Casey et al.,
2008) and neuroplasticity is heightened (Fuhrmann et al., 2015). Spe-
ciﬁcally, we examined possible bidirectional eﬀects between stress and
neural risk sensitivity: (i) insular risk processing would predict in-
creases in adolescent risk-taking behaviors via its inﬂuence on per-
ceived stress, and/or (ii) perceived stress would predict adolescent risk-
taking behaviors via its inﬂuence on insular risk processing. Ad-
ditionally, we examined the moderating role of neural cognitive control
in these relations. Based on prior ﬁndings reporting sex diﬀerences in
stress eﬀects (e.g., Uy and Galván, 2017), we further explored sex dif-
ferences in the hypothesized associations among stress, risk related
insular activation, and risk-taking behaviors.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
The current sample included 167 adolescents (53% males).
Adolescents were 13 or 14 years of age at Time 1 (M=14.13,
SD=0.54) and 14 or 15 years of age at Time 2 (M=15.05,
SD=0.54). Adolescents primarily identiﬁed as Caucasian (80%),
African-American (13%), and other (7%). Family annual income was
relatively low with a mean of $35,000-$ 49,999 at both times. At Time
1, 157 adolescents participated. However, 17 adolescents did not return
at Time 2 (approximately one year later) for reasons including: inelig-
ibility for tasks (n=2), declined participation (n=7), and lost contact
(n=8). At Time 2, 10 additional adolescents were invited to partici-
pate in the study, leading to a ﬁnal sample of 167 adolescents. Attrition
analyses indicated that the 17 adolescents who did not return for Time
2 were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent on demographic (age, income, race,
sex) or study variables (perceived stress, risk-taking behaviors, insular
risk and neural cognitive control processing Time 1) from the 140
adolescents who did return (all ps > .29). Exclusion criteria included
claustrophobia, history of head injury resulting in loss of consciousness
for more than 10min, orthodontia impairing image acquisition, and
contraindications to magnetic resonance imaging.
2.2. Procedure
Adolescent participants and their parents were recruited as part of a
longitudinal study via email announcements, ﬂyers, notice on the in-
ternet, or snowball sampling (word-of-mouth). The current study used
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data from Time 1 and Time 2, approximately one year apart. Adolescent
participants provided written assent and their parents provided written
consent for a protocol approved by the university’s institutional review
board. Both parents and adolescents received monetary compensation
for their time.
2.3. Measures
2.3.1. Perceived stress
Perceived stress was assessed at Time 1 and Time 2 using the 10-
item Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen and Williamson, 1988) that has
been well validated to assess for perceptions of stress. Adolescents re-
ported about thoughts and feelings they have experienced within the
past month (e.g., “In the last month, how often have you felt nervous
and ‘stressed’?”) on a 5-point Likert scale (0=Never to 4=Very
Often). Mean scores were calculated, with higher scores indicating
higher perceived stress (α=0.83 at Time 1 and Time 2).
2.3.2. Risk-taking behaviors
Risk-taking behaviors were assessed at Time 1 and Time 2 using the
Things I Do questionnaire (Conger and Elder, 1994). Adolescents re-
ported about things they may have done in the last year (0= not at all,
1= once or twice, and 2=more than twice). A full list of all items can
be found in Appendix A. Mean scores were calculated, with higher
scores indicated higher risk-taking behaviors (α=0.74 at Time 1 and
α=0.77 at Time 2).
2.3.3. Imaging acquisition and analysis
For both risk processing and cognitive control tasks, functional
neuroimaging data were acquired on a 3T Siemens TIM Trio MRI
scanner with a standard 12-channel head matrix coil. Echo-planar
images (EPIs) were collected using the following parameters: slice
thickness= 4mm, 34 axial slices, ﬁeld of view
(FoV)=220×220mm, repetition time (TR)= 2 s, echo time
(TE)= 30ms, ﬂip angle= 90°, voxel size= 3.4375×3.4375× 4mm
(during analysis the images were resliced so that voxels were
3× 3×3mm), 64×64 grid, and slices were hyperangulated at 30 °
from anterior-posterior commissure. The structural scan was acquired
using a high-resolution magnetization prepared rapid acquisition gra-
dient echo sequence with the following parameters: TR= 1200ms,
TE= 3.02ms, FoV=245×245mm, and 192 slices with the spatial
resolution of 1×1×1mm. FMRI data were preprocessed and ana-
lyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Neuroimaging Center). For each
scan, functional imaging data were corrected for head motion using a
six-parameter rigid body transformation and realigned. The mean
functional image was co-registered to the anatomical image, then the
anatomical image was segmented and registered to the MNI template
and functional volumes were normalized using parameters from the
segmented anatomical image, and were smoothed using a 6mm full-
width-half-maximum Gaussian ﬁlter.
2.3.4. Insular risk processing
Adolescents engaged in a lottery choice task at Time 1 and Time 2 in
which they made choices between pairs of gambles in a modiﬁed eco-
nomic lottery choice task (Holt and Laury, 2002) while their BOLD
response was monitored using fMRI (see Fig. 1a and b). For each
gamble, there was a high and low monetary outcome, each associated
with a speciﬁc probability. The associations between outcomes and
probabilities were represented with corresponding colors (orange or
blue). Pie charts were used to represent probabilities associated with
potential payoﬀs to maximize comprehension of numerical information
for adolescent participants. There were 10 slices in each pie, each
corresponding to a probability of 10%. Participants were presented
with slices representing the probability of receiving a high (orange) or
low (blue) monetary outcome (see Fig. 1a). Monetary outcomes and
probabilities varied across trials. The associated risk for each gamble
was measured using coeﬃcient of variation (CV),1 a scale-free metric
calculated by dividing the standard deviation by expected value. Re-
searchers have found that CV is a stronger predictor of choice behavior
compared to standard economic measures of risk (e.g., standard de-
viation or variance) because calculations of risk are often made relative
to the average outcome (Bach et al., 2017; Weber et al., 2004). For each
pair of gambles, one option was always riskier (higher CV) than the
other (lower CV). In order to incentivize performance, participants
were compensated based on their actual winnings from 5 randomly
selected trials (Smith, 1976). Participants were told that each trial was
independent from all other trials and was equally likely to be selected
for compensation. Each participant took approximately 30min to
complete a total of 72 trials.
At the subject level of the general linear model (GLM), the decision
and outcome events of the task were modeled with a duration of 4 and
2 s, respectively. A parametric regressor of decision phase activity
equivalent to the CV for chosen gambles was included in the model.
Additionally, a parametric regressor indicating whether subjects re-
ceived high or low monetary outcomes during the outcome phase was
included into the model. At the group level of the GLM, whole brain
analysis was conducted to determine how CV for chosen gambles
modulated BOLD responses during the decision phase (see Appendix B).
Given the consistent and robust results implicating the insular cortex as
a key region involved in risk processing (Mohr et al., 2010), we hy-
pothesized that BOLD responses in the bilateral insular cortex would be
adjusted by the level of CV (i.e., level of risk). To test a priori hy-
potheses, region of interest (ROI) analyses were performed using SPM8.
Eigenvariate values were extracted for the left and right insular cortex
using a 6mm sphere around the peak voxel coordinates for each region
(left: x=−30, y=17, z=−14; right: x=30, y=20, z=−11). See
Appendix B for all regions associated with increasing CV during the
decision phase. Fig. 1c illustrates activation in the bilateral insular
cortex during the lottery choice task for Time 1 and Time 2. We created
a latent factor score to operationalize insular risk processing using bi-
lateral insular eigenvariate values, with higher scores indicating higher
BOLD responses in the insular cortex (see Appendix D for more in-
formation).
2.3.5. Neural cognitive control
Adolescents engaged in a multi-source interference task (MSIT; Bush
et al., 2003) at Time 1 during which adolescents’ BOLD response was
recorded (see Fig. 2a). During the task, adolescents were presented with
sequences of three digits, two of which were identical. Subjects were
required to indicate the identity—but not the position—of the oddball
digit. In neutral trials, the identity of the target digit was congruent
with the digit’s presented location. In interference trials, the identity of
the target digit was incongruent with the digit’s presented location. In
line with previous studies (Bush et al., 2003), we found a signiﬁcant
MSIT interference eﬀect in reaction time for correct responses, t
(153)= 69.58, p < .001 and accuracy between conditions, t
(153)=−15.47, p < .001 (i.e., accuracy was lower and reaction time
was higher for interference compared to neutral trials).
To derive activation in cognitive control areas, individual-level ROI
values were extracted for each participant at coordinates corresponding
to peak activations in the interference minus neutral second-level
contrast (see Appendix C). Eigenvariate values of the contrast images
were extracted using spherical masks of 6mm surrounding MNI co-
ordinates, thresholded at p < .001, family-wise error corrected (see
1 Coeﬃcient of variation (CV) was used to calculate the level of risk associated with
each option, with higher values of CV corresponding to increased levels of risk. CV for
each option represents the ratio of the standard deviation of potential outcomes asso-
ciated with an option to the expected value (EV) of that option:
= +EV P V P V* *high high low low (1); =
− + −
CV
Phigh Vhigh EV Plow Vlow EV
EV
( )2 ( )2
(2). Phigh and
Plow is the probability of the high and low outcome, respectively, Vhigh and Vlow is the
high and low monetary outcome.
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Fig. 2b). We created a latent factor score to operationalize neural
cognitive control, and this neural cognitive control factor score corre-
lated signiﬁcantly with accuracy and reaction time diﬀerence scores
(−0.40 and 0.36, ps < .001), indicating that higher interference-re-
lated BOLD activation in these regions was associated with lower cog-
nitive control (see Appendix D for more information).
2.4. Statistical analyses
We conducted longitudinal moderated mediation analyses using
structural equation modeling (SEM) following recommendations by
Hayes (2013) in Mplus 7.4 (Muthén and Muthén, 1998–2015). The
missing data pattern resembled a Completely at Random pattern (Lit-
tle's MCAR test on study variables: χ2= 73.78, df=63, p= .17).
Therefore, we used Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation
with robust standard errors (MLR) to account for missing data and non-
normal distributions. We calculated bias-corrected bootstrap con-
ﬁdence intervals (CIs) for indirect eﬀects using 10,000 bootstrapping
samples.
In the ﬁrst step (i.e., the main eﬀect model), we tested two com-
peting models. First, we tested the indirect eﬀect of perceived stress
Time 1 on risk-taking behaviors Time 2 via insular risk processing Time
2 (Model a, Fig. E1, Appendix E). Second, we tested the indirect eﬀect
of insular risk processing Time 1 on risk-taking behaviors Time 2 via
perceived stress Time 2 (Model b, Fig. E2, Appendix E). In both models,
we controlled for earlier levels of the mediator and the outcome vari-
ables by regressing Time 2 scores on Time 1 scores. Thus, we predict the
residualized change. Such a measure is preferred over simple diﬀerence
scores, because diﬀerence scores can have high measurement error and
do not adjust for baseline diﬀerences. In contrast, residualized scores
mitigate some of the problems of simple diﬀerence scores by for
instance adjusting for baseline diﬀerences (MacKinnon et al., 2013).
Although the main eﬀects of neural cognitive control were not part of
our hypotheses, we estimated the main eﬀects of neural cognitive
control Time 1 on risk-taking behaviors Time 2 to test subsequent in-
teraction eﬀects. In the second step (i.e., the interaction eﬀect model),
we tested the moderating eﬀects of neural cognitive control on the di-
rect and indirect eﬀects (see Figs. E1 and E2 in Appendix E). For model
parsimony, only signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects were retained. To ex-
plore sex diﬀerences, we conducted multiple group SEM. Here, we
compared a model in which main and interaction eﬀects were con-
strained to be equal between boys and girls to a model where main and
interaction eﬀects were freely estimated between boys and girls using
the Satorra-Bentler chi-square diﬀerence test (Satorra and Bentler,
2001). A signiﬁcant worse ﬁt of the model with equality constraints
compared to a model allowing estimates to vary between the two sex
groups indicates presence of sex diﬀerences. An α level of 0.05 was used
for the signiﬁcance of all statistical tests.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Exploration of the data revealed one extreme low insular risk pro-
cessing score at Time 1 and two extreme high risk insular processing
scores at Time 2. These scores were winsorized to the next value that
was not an outlier (i.e., within 3 SD) to retain statistical power and
attenuate bias resulting from elimination (Ghosh and Vogt, 2012).
Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics and correlations for all study
variables. Frequency distributions of adolescent perceived stress and
risk-taking behaviors can be found in Appendix F. Both perceived stress
and risk-taking behaviors signiﬁcantly increased from Time 1 to Time 2
Fig. 1. a) In the lottery choice task, adolescents were asked to
choose between pairs of uncertain gambles. For each gamble,
there was a high and low monetary outcome, each associated with
a speciﬁc probability. The associations between outcomes and
probabilities are represented with corresponding colors (orange or
blue), b) Each trial consisted of a decision phase, a ﬁxation phase,
an outcome phase, and an inter-trial-interval (ITI), c) During the
decision phase of the economic lottery choice task, adolescents
exhibited increased BOLD responses in the bilateral anterior in-
sular cortex to chosen gambles that were of higher relative to
lower levels of risk (i.e., coeﬃcient of variation; CV) at both Time
1 [t(145)= 7.22, p(FWE correction) < .05)] and Time 2 [(t
(135)= 7.91, p(FWE correction) < .05]. Figure reprinted from
Lauharatanahirun, N., Maciejewski, D., Holmes, C.J., Deater-
Deckard, K., Kim-Spoon, J., & King-Casas, B. (accepted). Neural
correlates of risk processing among adolescents: Inﬂuences of
parental monitoring and household chaos. Child Development. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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(t(138)=−2.84, p= .005 and t(134)=−2.22, p= .03, respectively).
Multivariate general linear modeling (GLM) analyses indicated that
none of the demographic variables had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the out-
come variable (risk-taking behaviors Time 2), including gender
(p= .53), ethnicity (contrasting white vs. non-white, p= .33), family
income (p= .13), and age (p= .31).
3.2. Main eﬀect model
We ﬁrst ﬁt two competing indirect models to test whether perceived
stress predicted changes in risk-taking behaviors via changes in insular
risk processing (Model a in Fig. E1 in Appendix E) or whether insular
risk processing predicted changes in risk-taking behaviors via changes
in perceived stress (Model b in Fig. E2 in Appendix E). Both models
showed good model ﬁts (χ2= 0.67, df=2, p= .71, CFI= 1.00,
RMSEA=0.00 for Model 1a; and χ2= 4.81, df=2, p= .09,
CFI= 0.98, RMSEA=0.09 for Model 1b). In order to formally test
whether the path went from perceived stress Time 1 to insular risk
processing Time 2 or from insular risk processing Time 1 to perceived
stress Time 2, we ﬁtted a cross-lagged model with insular risk proces-
sing Time 1 and Time 2 and perceived stress Time 1 and Time 2. We
then tested whether including cross-lagged paths would signiﬁcantly
improve model ﬁt. Results showed that including a path from perceived
stress Time 1 to insular risk processing Time 2 did not signiﬁcantly
improve model ﬁt (Δχ2= 1.66, df=1, p= .20), whereas including a
path from insular risk processing Time 1 to perceived stress Time 2
improved model ﬁt (Δχ2= 3.44, df=1, p= .06). Therefore, we chose
to continue with Model 1b. As shown in Table 2, results of Model 1b
Fig. 2. a) In the multi-source interference task
(MSIT), adolescents were asked to identify the digit
that diﬀered from two other concurrently presented
digits, ignoring its position in the sequence. b)
Adolescents exhibited greater activation for inter-
ference relative to neutral conditions in the regions
of left posterior-medial frontal cortex, right and left
inferior frontal gyrus, left and right inferior parietal
lobules, right insula, right superior frontal gyrus, and
left middle frontal gyrus, displayed at p
(FWE) < .001 (see Appendix B). Reprinted from
Kim-Spoon, J., Maciejewski, D., Lee, J., Deater-
Deckard, K., & King-Casas (2017). Longitudinal as-
sociations among family environment, neural cogni-
tive control, and social competence among adoles-
cents. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 26,
69–76. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2017.04.009.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations of Study Variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 M SD Min Max
1. Neural cognitive control Time 1 0.81 0.35 −0.01 2.24
2. Insular risk processing Time 1 .02 0.03 0.81 −1.84 3.45
3. Insular risk processing Time 2 .14 .33*** −0.05 0.74 −1.73 2.26
4. Perceived stress Time 1 .07 −.13 −.15 1.48 0.66 0.00 3.40
5. Perceived stress Time 2 .21* −.19* −.11 .62*** 1.60 0.63 0.20 3.10
6. Risk-taking behaviors Time 1 .03 −.01 −.06 .17* .12 0.24 0.19 0.00 1.00
7. Risk-taking behaviors Time 2 .21* −.06 −.04 .14 .28*** .64*** 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.95
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indicated that low insular risk processing predicted increases in per-
ceived stress, which in turn predicted increases in risk-taking behaviors.
Scatterplots of those main eﬀects can be found in Appendix G. The
indirect eﬀect from insular risk processing to increases in risk-taking
behaviors via increases in perceived stress was signiﬁcant
(B=−0.005, SE=0.004, 95% CI [−0.016;−0.0004], b*=−0.021).
However, low insular risk processing at Time 1 did not directly predict
increases in risk-taking behaviors. In contrast to Model 1b, in Model 1a,
none of the paths between insular risk processing, perceived stress, and
risk-taking behaviors were signiﬁcant (see Appendix H for model esti-
mates).
3.3. Interaction eﬀect model
After determining the direction of eﬀects between perceived stress
and insular risk processing, we continued to test for the moderating
eﬀect of neural cognitive control in Model 1b. The results indicated that
neural cognitive control moderated only the path between insular risk
processing Time 1 and perceived stress Time 2 (see Table 2 and Fig. 3).
This moderation model showed a good model ﬁt (χ2= 5.93, df=3,
p= .11, CFI= 0.98, RMSEA=0.08).
To further evaluate this moderating eﬀect of neural cognitive con-
trol, we conducted simple slope analyses to examine the eﬀects of in-
sular risk processing at varying levels of neural cognitive control: low
interference-related BOLD responses during the MSIT task (i.e., 1 SD
below the mean, good neural cognitive control) versus high inter-
ference-related BOLD responses (i.e., 1 SD above the mean, poor neural
cognitive control). As shown in Fig. 4, results indicated that the
association between insular risk processing at Time 1 and changes in
perceived stress was signiﬁcant for adolescents with poor neural cog-
nitive control (B=−0.19, SE=0.07, p= .005), but not for adoles-
cents with good neural cognitive control (B=−0.01, SE=0.05,
p= .86). Moreover, the indirect eﬀect from insular risk processing at
Time 1 to increases in risk-taking behaviors via increases in perceived
stress was signiﬁcant for adolescents with poor neural cognitive control
(B=−0.012, SE=0.007, 95% CI [−0.029; −0.002], b*=−0.045),
but not for adolescents with good neural cognitive control
(B=−0.001, SE=0.004, 95% CI [−0.008; 0.008], b*=−0.002). As
such, results indicate a buﬀering eﬀect of neural cognitive control
against the detrimental eﬀects of low insular risk processing on changes
in risk-taking behaviors mediated through changes in perceived stress.
The multiple SEM for testing sex diﬀerences in main and interaction
eﬀects revealed that the above mentioned relations did not diﬀer be-
tween boys and girls, Δχ2 (6)= 4.90, p= .56. We additionally ran the
ﬁnal model with only Time 1 scores to check for model validity cross-
sectionally. However, this model showed a poor ﬁt, χ2= 2.84, p= .09,
CFI= 0.60, RMSEA=0.11. This corroborates the assumption that the
brain eﬀects may take some time to occur, highlighting the necessity to
examine neurobiological eﬀects in a longitudinal fashion.
4. Discussion
To date, there is limited literature discussing how stress interfaces
with neural systems of risk processing and cognitive control to con-
tribute to the development of adolescent real-world risky behavior.
Given the key role of the insula in encoding risk during value-based
Table 2
Parameter Estimates for Testing the Moderating Role of Neural Cognitive Control Time 1 on the Indirect Eﬀect from Insular Risk Processing Time 1 to Risk-taking Behaviors Time 2 via
Perceived Stress Time 2.
B SE p b* (beta)
Step 1: Main eﬀects
Insular risk processing Time 1→ perceived stress Time 2 −0.09 0.05 0.05 −0.11
Neural cognitive control Time 1→ perceived stress Time 2 0.26 0.09 0.005 0.14
Insular risk processing Time 1→ risk-taking behaviors Time 2 −0.01 0.01 0.69 −0.02
Neural cognitive control Time 1→ risk-taking behaviors Time 2 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.16
Perceived stress Time 2→ risk-taking behaviors Time 2 0.06 0.02 0.004 0.18
Step 2: Interaction eﬀects
Insular risk processing Time 1× neural cognitive control Time 1→ perceived stress Time 2 −0.26 0.11 0.02 −0.12
Perceived stress Time 2× neural cognitive control Time 1→ risk-taking behaviors Time 2 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.11
Insular risk processing Time 1× neural cognitive control Time 1→ risk-taking behaviors Time 2 −0.05 0.06 0.39 −0.07
Note: Perceived stress Time 2 was controlled for perceived stress Time 1 (B=0.55, SE=0.06, p < .001, b*=0.57). Risk-taking behaviors Time 2 were controlled for risk-taking
behaviors Time 1 (B=0.69, SE=0.08, p < .001, b*=0.61). Stability coeﬃcients are reported from the ﬁnal model.
Neural insular risk 
processing Time 1
Neural cognitive 
control Time 1
Perceived stress 
Time 2
Perceived stress 
Time 1
Risk-taking 
behaviors Time 2
Risk-taking 
behaviors Time 1
-.07.11-.12*
-.02
-.11* .18**
.57*** .61***
Fig. 3. Final model showing the relation among neural insula processing, neural cognitive control processing, perceived stress and risk-taking behaviors. Arrows pointing on other arrows
indicate moderation eﬀects. Standardized estimates are presented. * p≤ .05, ** p < .01, *** p≤ .001.
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decision-making under uncertainty (Mohr et al., 2010) and the known
association between stress and decision making under uncertainty
(Starcke and Brand, 2016), we examined the interplay between per-
ceived stress and neural correlates of risk processing and cognitive
control as potential contributing factors to the development of adoles-
cent risk-taking behavior. The results show that low risk processing in
the insular cortex was related to increases in perceived stress and
subsequent increases in risk-taking behaviors only for adolescents with
poor neural cognitive control (i.e., high interference-related BOLD re-
sponses), but not for adolescents with good neural cognitive control
(i.e., low interference-related BOLD responses).
Current neuroscience literature emphasizes the importance of the
anterior insula in decision making among adolescents (Smith et al.,
2014; Wood and Bechara, 2014), yet research has not examined the
ways through which insular risk-related processing may contribute to
individual diﬀerences in the development of risk-taking behaviors. A
large body of behavioral research has found that the presence of un-
certainty within decision-making situations often produces stress due to
a perceived lack of control or predictability over outcomes (de Berker
et al., 2016; Koolhaas et al., 2011 for reviews). The present study oﬀers
evidence demonstrating that insular risk-related processes involved in
detecting uncertainty within the environment are related to increases in
perceived stress, ultimately aﬀecting the development of real-world
risk-taking behaviors among adolescents. Importantly, these results
indicate a moderating eﬀect of neural cognitive control over insular risk
processing supporting theoretical work emphasizing the interaction
between motivational and cognitive control systems in predicting risk-
taking (Casey et al., 2008; Kim-Spoon et al., 2017b). In particular, al-
though low risk processing in the insular cortex is likely related to in-
creases in risk-taking behaviors via increased perceived stress, this
pathway only applied to adolescents with poor neural cognitive control
but not to those with good neural cognitive control. This ﬁnding is
consistent with a recent cross-sectional study showing that BOLD re-
sponses in the anterior insula during risk processing interacted with
dACC activity during an inhibitory control task to predict risk-taking
behaviors among adolescents (i.e., substance abuse and risky sexual
behaviors; Kim-Spoon et al., 2017a). Our longitudinal data clarify that
the moderating eﬀect of neural cognitive control operates by protecting
early adolescents with neural vulnerability during risky decision-
making (shown in low insular risk processing) against their increasing
perceptions of stress.
The longitudinal ﬁndings of the current study further clarify the
direction of the link between insular risk processing and stress.
Speciﬁcally, we examined whether insula activation during risk pro-
cessing may be a neural risk factor that indicates adolescents’ vulner-
ability to experiencing increased stress over time. We also examined
whether stress exposure may be an environmental risk factor that alters
insula activation during risk processing over time. Our data revealed
that insular risk processing predicted changes in perceived stress over
time, whereas perceived stress did not predict changes in insular risk
processing. These ﬁndings suggest that low risk processing coupled
with poor neural cognitive control may represent a neural vulnerability
factor that puts adolescents at risk for experiencing more stress, and
subsequently for engaging in risk-taking behaviors. Previous studies
have indicated that higher BOLD responses in the anterior insula during
decision-making tasks are related to more risk avoidance in adolescents
(van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2015). Thus, a blunted engagement of the
insula might suggest either a lack of or a diﬃculty in processing risk,
which may lead to decreases in risk aversion. If those adolescents do not
possess suﬃcient neural cognitive control capacities to regulate such
risk processing diﬃculties, then they may be more susceptible to en-
tering risky situations. This in turn might increase perceived stress,
perhaps due to the decreased sensitivity of encoding the potential ne-
gative outcomes of their actions.
Further, our ﬁnding provides insight into the role of naturally oc-
curring stress in the development of adolescent risk-taking behaviors by
illustrating that increases in perceived stress are related to increases in
risk-taking behaviors. This ﬁnding largely corresponds with prior
longitudinal studies showing that stress increases various risk-taking
behaviors among adolescents, including substance use and aggression
(Copeland-Linder et al., 2011; Herts et al., 2012). It has been suggested
that risk-taking behaviors provide an outlet for relief from un-
comfortable and stressful periods or situations (Zillmann and Bryant,
1985). Importantly, our ﬁndings suggest speciﬁcity in that perceived
stress (or naturally occurring stress experiences) may be aﬀected by
neural representations of risk that guide risky decision making, whereas
acute stress may increase heightened reliance on immediate and po-
tentially high reward (Starcke and Brand, 2016). Also, despite earlier
research indicating possible sex diﬀerences in acute stress eﬀects (e.g.,
Uy and Galván, 2017), the demonstrated pathways did not diﬀer be-
tween boys and girls as indicated by the multiple group comparison by
sex. This ﬁnding of non-signiﬁcant gender moderation is consistent
with the recent review on the eﬀects of stress on decision making under
uncertainty by Starcke and Brand (2016).
Findings from the present study need to be interpreted in light of its
limitations. First, perceived stress and risk-taking behaviors were based
on self-report and therefore these associations might have been inﬂated
due to shared method variance. Future studies could beneﬁt from in-
volving multiple informants and observational methods to reduce po-
tential method bias. Moreover, although we had longitudinal data, it
was restricted to two time-points. Ideally, future research should in-
volve multiple time points as mediation models assume temporal se-
quences across the predictor, the mediator, and the outcome (Cole and
Maxwell, 2003). Moreover, it is remarkable that some of the relations
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
low cognit ive
b* = -.24**
b* = -.01
Fig. 4. Simple slope analyses comparing the relation between insular risk
processing and perceived stress for adolescents with high cognitive control
(low interference-related BOLD responses) and adolescents with low cog-
nitive control (high interference-related BOLD responses). ** p < .01.
Perceived stress Time 2 is controlled for perceived stress Time 1.
Standardized estimates (b*) are presented.
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were not present at Time 1, but present at Time 2 (e.g., the association
between perceived stress and risk-taking behaviors). It is possible that
such eﬀects are only present at a later developmental stage, when more
stress and risk-taking behaviors occur. Indeed, both measures sig-
niﬁcantly increased over time. Similarly, our model did not ﬁt when
only using cross-sectional data. The poor model ﬁt of the cross-sectional
model strengthens our argument that the eﬀects of brain variable are
panning out over time and are absent in a cross-sectional snap shot.
Therefore, had we had run only cross-sectional analyses, we could have
missed this important longitudinal eﬀect. This highlights the im-
portance of looking at developmental processes and changes using
prospective longitudinal data. Finally, it is also important to note that
the interaction eﬀects between insular risk processing and neural cog-
nitive control at Time 1 did not directly predict increases in risk-taking
behaviors, but only indirectly by increases in perceived stress. Given the
direct associations of interaction eﬀects between insular risk processing
and neural cognitive control found among late adolescents (e.g., Kim-
Spoon et al., 2017a,b), further research is warranted to test whether the
direct interaction eﬀects between insular risk processing and neural
cognitive control on risk-taking behaviors depend on the developmental
stage.
5. Conclusion
Adolescence is thought to be a sensitive period for experiencing
stress and engagement in risky behaviors, although more empirical
evidence from human studies is warranted (Fuhrmann et al., 2015).
Despite the fact that much has been learned from the behavioral work
examining how uncertainty is related to stress (see Starcke and Brand,
2016 for a review), research regarding how stress interfaces with both
motivational and cognitive control neural systems to aﬀect adolescent
risk-taking behaviors is limited. Here, our ﬁndings provide critical
evidence for the important role of perceived stress in risk-taking be-
haviors: The combination of low insular risk processing and poor neural
cognitive control in prefrontal cortex areas may represent a neural
vulnerability that places adolescents at increased risk for experiencing
more stress and subsequently for engaging in more risk-taking beha-
viors. Furthermore, our longitudinal analyses clarify that insular risk
processing was predictive of changes in perceived stress, rather than
vice versa. Reducing stressful experiences when faced with uncertainty
and guiding adolescents toward optimal coping strategies within these
situations may be crucial elements to boost the eﬀectiveness of inter-
ventions (e.g., cognitive control training) targeting reductions of risk-
taking behaviors in the long term.
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